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During everydayweb browsing and search users reveal many pieces
of private information to third parties. Even though people report
being concerned about their privacy online, they often do not take
steps to protect it. This is known as the ‘privacy paradox’ in the lit-
erature. In this work we study two well-known strategies based on
theories from the behavioral sciences, nudging and boosting, which
encourage users to browse in a way that their private data are less
exposed. First, an online survey (N=127) tested the comprehensibil-
ity and efficacy of various facts (boosts), before the most effective
of these were evaluated against ‘nudge’ interventions previously
shown to be efficacious in lab-studies. A three week naturalistic
study (N=68) using a browser extension revealed that both nudges
and boosts improve browsing privacy, as approximated by different
measures. Boosts are also shown to improve user knowledge about
privacy in the short term, but the benefit weakens over time.
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World wide, users spend almost 7 hours per day online [44], e.g.
searching for information or browsing the web. This can expose
private data, which can be harvested and used for many different
purposes [31], leading to, e.g. search or price discrimination [59],
targeted advertising [20] or even identity theft [12]. Despite many
users expressing concern about their privacy online, they seldom
take actions to protect it [45]. This is known as the privacy paradox
[61]. Often privacy breaches could be reduced with small changes
to user behaviour [32, 46]. If users could be persuaded to change
their actions, therefore, they, themselves, may provide a solution.
Nudges and boosts are competing strategies from the behavioral
sciences, which aim to change behavior [35] and have been studied
for diverse reasons in the interactive IR community [2, 7, 38, 91].
Nudges exploit human cognitive biases to subconsciously influence
behaviour towards favourable outcomes, whereas boosts empower
users by providingmore information or a better environment to sup-
port their decision making process [35]. Previous work has shown
that carefully designed nudges and boosts can reduce privacy im-
pacts [91] and cookie acceptance [17], increase password strength
[84], get users to pay a premium for privacy during online shopping
[22], encourage reflection on privacy behavior [62] or otherwise
promote behavior beneficial to privacy [1]. Such interventions have,
however, mainly been studied in highly controlled lab studies. It is
unclear, to what extent nudge and boost interventions can reduce
privacy invasion in real situations during every day internet usage.
To learn if nudges and boosts can help users to better preserve
their privacy, we first conducted a between-groups online survey
to evaluate 6 different boosts. Afterwards, we deployed both in-
terventions over three 1-week-long study phases using a browser
extension in a mixed design with the two interventions and a con-
trol condition. Boosts improved participants’ privacy knowledge in
the short term, but knowledge gained is not retained over longer
time periods. Since knowledge influences behavioral intentions,
this could lead to a reduced effectiveness of boosts over time in
terms of behavioral change [39]. Changes to cookies were reduced
in the nudge group and third party requests in the boost group
during and after the intervention deployment. This suggests that
nudges and boosts could lead to higher browsing privacy in users.
2 RELATEDWORK
We describe related work concerning online privacy and summarize
how web tracking compromises users’ privacy. We then outline
different technological and behavioral counter-interventions.
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2.1 Current State of Online Privacy
Privacy is a complex construct, representing: “... control over trans-
actions between person(s) and other(s), the ultimate aim of which is
to enhance autonomy and/or to minimize vulnerability.”[53, p.10].
Online privacy is relevant for users’ everyday lives and awareness
of this has increased since the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) became active in Europe on May 25 20181. On one hand,
this can be a tool for users to control their data online [72], but on
the other the requests for consent may just be a source of annoy-
ance for users [86]. Consent notices can also use design elements to
nudge users to disclose more [51], thus counteracting their purpose.
Possibly in response to this, German legislation recently banned
pre-selected privacy invasive choices in such notices [78]. This is
an example of an attempt to protect online privacy through law.
Even though there are other threats to online privacy, such as
insecure data storage, we focus on web tracking, since it can be
operationalized to measure browsing privacy. Web tracking means
that personal information is collected about users’ online behavior
[12]. Users cannot completely control this and in some cases are
not aware of it [79], contrary to the way they control disclosure of,
e.g., their contact data on social media. However, it is possible for
them to influence web tracking, unlike e.g. data storage security.
Tracking methods developed from early session-only methods
[12] to the various cross-session methods of today, such as cookies
and browser fingerprinting [24]. There are many personal and
societal harms that result from such practices:Web tracking can lead
to search or price discrimination [36, 59] or targeted advertising,
which can also be discriminatory [20]. The large amount of data
collected on individuals online makes it easier to steal identities
using both data actively disclosed on the web and accumulated by
web tracking [12]. In a broader context, web tracking can be used
to sway elections, as was investigated for the 2016 US election [42].
In general, internet users are concerned about their privacy on-
line [6, 25, 74], but that does not mean that they actively protect it
[45]. This discrepancy - the privacy paradox [61]- has been exten-
sively studied in previous work, both providing evidence supporting
[e.g 15, 77], and contesting the notion [e.g. 49, 82]. In case of a pri-
vacy paradox, users do not take actions to protect their privacy, e.g.
disclose less information online [77] or pay more for less privacy
invasive services [9], even though they are concerned about online
privacy. When the privacy paradox is absent, more concerned users
act on their concerns and try to protect their privacy more than
less concerned users, e.g. by changing their privacy settings [11].
2.2 Technological Interventions
The development of technology to reduce privacy invasion is like a
cat-and-mouse game with technology being countered by newer
methods of tracking. Tracking protection often makes use of black-
lists [12], but it is difficult to correctly identify trackers [27]. The use
of heuristics to identify trackers, complete blocking of javascript
[57], filtering or changing requests, e.g. through query obfusca-
tion [33, 63], or hiding the IP address, e.g. using anonymous proxy
servers or VPN services are all different methods to protect on-
line privacy [12]. All of these, however, require a certain degree
1The GDPR is an European regulation focused on privacy and data protection, see
also https://gdpr-info.eu/.
of technological knowledge. Using privacy-focused search engines
or private browsing mode [12] are more accessible strategies. Con-
trary to popular belief, the latter does not prevent tracking, but only
prevents attackers with access to the user’s computer from seeing
the user’s browsing history [30]. Other techniques which preserve
privacy include omitting data to make individual users more similar
[50, 76] or using communities to hide individual users’ data [71].
However, individual users cannot easily use these techniques, since
they have to be implemented by software providers.
2.3 Behavioral Interventions
Implementing technological measures requires action from users,
e.g. installing a browser extension to block tracking, or actively
changing browser settings, but lack of knowledge, both about their
existence and their application hinders their adoption [69, 81]. In-
creasing privacy during web browsing, therefore, requires users to
change their behavior. Changing user behavior such that it aligns
better with their privacy concerns can prevent user regret [88]. In
this work, we examine two strategies from the cognitive and be-
havioral sciences (boosting and nudging) which aim to encourage
behavioral change to reduce risk of harm to the individual and
more broadly to society. Other strategies apply to communities as a
whole, e.g. by influencing social norms [67], however, since privacy
preferences vary, we focus on the two most popular interventions
targeted at individuals, which we introduce in the following.
Nudges exploit systematic cognitive biases to influence behav-
ior [80]. These biases are seen as the source of humans’ failure to
make completely rational decisions due to their lack of resources,
termed bounded rationality [70]. Nudges are “any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives”[80] (p. 6). A classic nudge is one that manip-
ulates the environment in a non-transparent way and sets a default
opt-out mechanism which does not prevent the individual from
other options (e.g. in some countries, being an organ donor is the
default and one must opt-out). ’Educative’ nudges, such as warn-
ing labels [22, 91], are a more transparent approach which address
some ethical concerns raised with nudging [35, 39], but they do not
empower individuals with skills to overcome their cognitive biases.
Boosts address the issues raised with nudging [35, 39] and also
promote behavioral change. Boosts assume that bounded rationality
stems from humans’ use of heuristics to make not optimal but satis-
fying decisions [34]. Contrary to nudges, boosts explicitly attempt
to heighten users’ knowledge and skills to better cope with the envi-
ronment in which they make decisions [40]. As boosts intervene in
a transparent manner, they are considered ethically sound [35, 39].
An example of a boost is teaching users heuristics to help them
make better decisions, e.g. showing them which types of web sites
generally contain fewer cookies and third party trackers, so they
can protect their privacy by reducing the frequency with which
they visit these sites. Boosts can give access to new abilities appli-
cable in a wide range of contexts or focused on a specific situation
[40]. Educative nudges overlap somewhat with short-term boosts,
which promote a competence useful in a specific situation [40].
Both nudges and boosts have been used to promote online pri-
vacy. Nudges were implemented as privacy indicators in search
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engines [22, 82, 90] and app stores [43], and by reranking or filter-
ing search results based on privacy metrics [91]. Social nudges –
interventions explicitly designed to exploit humans’ social nature
and their tendency to be influenced by their peers [80]– can re-
duce cookie acceptance among AmazonMechanical Turk users [17].
They compare users’ current behavior with their peers’ more prefer-
able behavior and have also been effectively applied in other do-
mains, such as energy conservation [3] or reducing food waste [21].
Boosts have also been applied to online privacy. They were used
to make privacy policies more accessible, for example, by using a
plugin to warn if a website’s privacy policy does not correspond
with a user’s expectation [19], or by presenting concise summaries
of privacy policy content in users’ current context of use [26, 62].
Another application was promoting secure actions on the internet,
including actionable tips [87]2.
2.4 Summary
While browsing the internet, it is challenging for users to control
their personal information, since many parties have an interest
in it [12, 24]. Technological interventions can help users protect
their data [12], but even concerned users often do not use these
adequately [45]. Behavioral interventions, such as nudges or boosts,
can promote privacy, although the evidence for this has come from
simulated laboratory studies [17, 90]. While longitudinal natural-
istic studies are a well-known tool in the IR and HIB community,
e.g. [8], to our knowledge, no such study has yet been conducted
to directly compare nudges and boosts with regards to browsing
privacy. Consequently, we do not know how effective nudges and
boosts for privacy are in practice.
3 DESIGNING BOOSTS
Since boosts aim to educate, comprehension is crucial to their effec-
tiveness [35]. We evaluated various boosts with an online survey
to then use the easiest to understand and most effective boosts in a
naturalistic study. Nudges differ in that they aim to influence users
subconsciously [80]. As such, it is not necessary to evaluate them
similarly. The boosts were inspired by previous work, from which
we extracted information pertaining to level of privacy invasion of
different types of websites [23, 85], as well as simple strategies to
preserve privacy, which do not require much technical knowledge,
such as using private browsing [83], disabling third party cookies
[23] and using adblockers [32]. We selected facts relating to these
aspects for boosts based on browser-independent applicability, and
accessibility even for non technically adept users. The survey was
conducted on the crowd sourcing platform Prolific3 in a between-
subjects design with seven conditions. There were six manipulation
conditions, one for each possible boost from related work, and one
control condition, where participants were not exposed to a boost.
3.1 Procedure
The survey was pretested with eight subjects to determine its du-
ration and ensure sufficient payment of participants. One boost,
which caused misunderstanding in the pretest, was excluded.
2Bavel et al refer to this approach as nudging, but according to the definitions above,
we consider it a boost.
3https://www.prolific.co/
In the final version, informed consent was obtained before par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to one of seven conditions. In the
manipulation conditions, they saw one boost and were asked two
questions referring to their subjective comprehension of this infor-
mation. Examples of the evaluated boosts can be found in Table 1,
while all evaluated boosts are on Github4. Following recommenda-
tions from Prolific, an attention check question was included [64].
On the next page, participants first had to imagine they were brows-
ing the internet and then answer questions, which required them
to use the knowledge from the boost. We utilized several broad
types of questions, whereby participants had to select specific URLs
from different website types (Which of the following websites share
data with the [most/least] third parties?), or where they either had
to select correct statements or estimate numbers of third parties
(Imagine that on a website, there are normally 10 third parties. How
many third parties are there in the given circumstances? Please
state a value between 0 and 10) pertaining to situations depicted
in screenshots of Firefox and Chrome browsers5. There were ques-
tions pertaining to each type of boost evaluated in the survey to
verify knowledge gain through that boost.
In the control condition, participants did not see a boost, but
then had to answer comprehension questions pertaining to all the
boosts. To prevent their workload from being much higher than in
the manipulation conditions, we reduced the number of questions
asked per boost and selected these question subsets randomly.
All participants also rated the helpfulness of each boost on a
seven-point likert scale from not at all helpful to very helpful (con-
cerning making their browsing more private). Finally, demographic
information was collected and the participants were debriefed.
3.2 Participants
A total of 127 participants took part via Prolific, taking on average
6.56 minutes to complete the study. The conditions received roughly
the same number of participants, with most of the conditions being
assigned to 18 participants, except the adblocking (17) and enter-
tainment (19) conditions. 70 of the participants identified as male,
56 as female, and 1 as diverse. They were between 18 and 67 years
old (𝑀 = 30.79, 𝑆𝐷 = 10.77) and most were either working (66) or
students (43), but 17 also reported currently not being employed,
and one person was retired. The participants had a relatively high
level of education, with 67 having at least a bachelor’s degree, 14 a
finished vocational training, 33 the entrance qualification to higher
education and 19 had graduated from other levels of schooling.
3.3 Results
All data analyses in this paper were conducted using the Gnu R
software [66] and assumed significance at 𝑝 = .05. To examine
whether boosts were successful in conveying knowledge, partici-
pants’ answers in a boost condition were compared to answers to
the same type of question of participants in the control condition.
For the website category boosts (news, entertainment, education)
and the private browsing boost, the percentage of correct answers
was calculated for both the manipulation and the control conditions.
4https://github.com/blueCat11/chiir-2021/tree/main/boosts
5Exact phrasing of these questions on Github: https://github.com/blueCat11/chiir-
2021/tree/main/questionnaires




Nudge Once per day one of:
• average of total privacy points per visited site
• number of privacy points achieved through browser
settings (average per visited site)
• number of privacy points achieved through website
visits (average per visited site)
• average number of third party requests per visited site
• average number of added cookies per visited site
Boost Once per day one of:
• Entertainment websites have more cookies and third
parties
• Education websites have less cookies and third parties
per page than most other kinds of websites
• Blocking third party cookies in the browser settings
leads to a reduction of the number of third parties per
page by about 30%.
• By using private browsing (Firefox) or incognito mode
(Chrome), cookies are deleted automatically after the
browser is closed.
• By using an adblocker, the number of third parties per
page is reduced by 40%, even without changing the
blocker settings.
Table 1: Interventions for each experimental group during
the 2nd week of the naturalistic study, translated from Ger-
man by first author. Only includes the interventions used in
the naturalistic study; does not contain the news boost.
Due to the small number of questions, possible percentages were
few, and thus the data cannot strictly be considered metric, so a
Wilcoxon rank sum test for ordinal data was conducted. Compre-
hension questions for third party reduction and adblocking boosts
asked participants how many third parties are present on average
on a certain site with different browser settings. Assuming the pres-
ence of ten third parties with default settings, the correct answer
would have been seven in case third party cookies are blocked,
and six when an adblocker is used. To measure the deviation from
this correct value, the absolute value of deviation from the correct
value was calculated and averaged over all the relevant questions
answered by the specific participant. Since normality was violated,
Wilcoxon rank sum tests were also conducted for these two boosts.
Results are in Table 2.
The results were used to select the boosts for the naturalistic
study, see Table 1 All boosts, except the third party reduction boost,
were effective: Participants in the manipulation conditions provided
more correct answers or answers that were closer to the correct
answer than participants in the control condition. This boost was
the only one where we could directly measure whether participants
heeded the advice it contained, so we retained it in the naturalistic
study, since it also did not significantly worsen participants’ knowl-
edge. However, the boost about news websites was removed for
control manipulation
boost M SD M SD W p
news 0.13 0.34 0.47 0.47 85 .017*
entertainment 0 0 0.97 0.11 0 <.001***
education 0.06 0.24 0.89 0.21 11 <.001***
private
browsing 0.67 0.24 0.85 0.21 99 .028*
adblocking 2.72 1.04 1.50 1.75 348 .002**
third party
reduction 3.86 2.07 3.67 3.86 638 .914
Table 2: Results of Wilcoxon rank sum tests to detect differ-
ences between boost and manipulation conditions
ethical reasons, since we did not want to promote filter bubbles by
encouraging participants to limit their news information sources.
4 NATURALISTIC STUDY
To determine the influence of nudges and boosts on browsing pri-
vacy, a three-week study was conducted in a naturalistic environ-
ment on the participants’ own devices, using a browser extension.
4.1 Study Design
We utilized a mixed design, with the study phase (pre-intervention,
intervention, post-intervention) being a within group and the con-
dition, e.g. the intervention to which the participants were exposed
(control, nudge, boost) a between group independent variable.
Since browsing privacy is not a concept that can be directly mea-
sured, we used previously applied proxies as dependent variables:
the number of new cookies stored after visiting a given site [56]
and the number of requests to third parties6 [e.g 23, 29]. Although
neither metric is exclusively related to tracking (cookies can be
used to provide functionality, such as remembering that a user was
already logged in, and third party requests may also load media),
they are deemed appropriate proxies given their strong association
with tracking [57]. We consequently assume that higher levels of
browsing privacy occur with lower numbers of third party requests
and cookies changes.
Behavioral features, such as which types of websites were visited,
and browser settings were also examined together with participants’
self-reported data on different concepts related to privacy. We mea-
sured affinity for technology interaction (ATI) [28] to further spec-
ify the sample. Privacy concerns were measured with a German
translation [37] of the Internet Users’ Information Privacy Con-
cerns questionnaire (IUIPC) [52]. Together with general knowledge
about privacy, as measured with the Online Privacy Literacy Scale
(OPLIS) [55, 81] and self-reported privacy behavior, these measures
were used to study the relationship between reported concerns
and actual behaviour. The questionnaire for privacy behavior was
adapted from Zimmerman et al [90], and translated to German by
the first author. Boost knowledge was also measured, using the
items used in the control condition of the boost evaluation.
6A third party is any site, other than the one which a user is currently visiting, which
receives data about them while they are interacting with the original site [65]
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(a) Screenshot of a nudge using privacy points
(b) Screenshot of the entertainment boost
Figure 1: Intervention examples, translated by first author
4.2 Interventions
Examples of the interventions, as users saw them during the study,
are depicted in Figure 1. We used the facts evaluated during the
online survey as five different boosts (see Table 1).
Nudges were implemented as social nudges, using the proxies
for browsing privacy. This kind of nudge was shown to be effec-
tive both in the privacy domain [17] and in other contexts [21].
The same number of variants were used for nudges and boosts to
make the learning effect through multiple exposure to the same
intervention comparable for participants in different conditions. To
achieve this we used an additional measure for browsing privacy
in nudges, which we called privacy points. They were assigned to
users when they exhibited behavior protecting their privacy, and
detracted when they encountered third party requests or cookies.
The different kinds of nudges used in the study are summarized
in Table 1. A participant’s average value of browsing privacy was
compared to all of the participants in the study. We combined the
textual representation of a participant’s rank within the group
with a visualization of privacy on a scale from red, for comparably
privacy invasive, to green, for comparably not as privacy invasive.
4.3 Apparatus
The study was implemented using a browser extension, a Post-
greSQL database backend and an Application Programming Inter-
face (API), with which the extension communicated. The browser
extension served three main purposes: It collected data on par-
ticipants’ browsing behavior related to our dependent variable
browsing privacy, while preserving their privacy. For example, we
did not collect the URL of the site they visited, but categorized
websites through the use of a domain categorizing API 7. Using
this API each website was assigned up to three categories, whereby
the first assigned category can be considered the main category.
In case of sensitive categories, e.g. adult content, the categories
were anonymized to uncategorized, which was also assigned when
a categorization was not possible through the API. The API was
chosen by comparing multiple available APIs to a ground truth
established by categorizing a set of websites by hand, and then
choosing the API with the best agreement with the ground truth.
Information on four different privacy related browser settings (Do
Not Track, private browsing, cookie blocking policy, and WebRTC
IP handling policy) was additionally collected for each website visit,
and we used these to calculate the privacy points measure used in
nudges.
Nudges or boosts were shown to participants once per day during
the intervention phase via a modal dialog. This interruption of
participant’s normal browsing provided a small measure of control,
since missing the intervention completely was not possible in this
setup. Participants were also able to access study information, such
as the lead author’s contact data, and depending on the study phase,
additional information, through the extension’s icon in the browser
tool bar. At the end of the study, a participation code was made
available to the participants through this interface, which they used
to confirm participation to obtain compensation in a way that did
not connect the data collected by the extension with their identity.
The extensionwas implemented for Firefox andChrome browsers,
as they are currently the most used browsers on desktop devices in
Germany, where the study took place [75], and they enable exten-
sions to be implemented using a unified API [58]. The extension
was based on previous work by [62] and [68], and we provide the
adapted code on Github8. The extension was extensively tested
prior to the study.
4.4 Procedure
Recruited participantsreceived instructions per e-mail and provided
informed consent two days before the study began. Participants
received illustrated instructions to install the extension on the
browser of their choice. They were encouraged to ask questions or
report any problems to the author. When the study extension was
correctly installed, it requested an anonymised participant id and
assigned the participant to one of the three conditions. Participants
filled out pre-study questionnaires and were prompted to use their
browser normally during the course of the next three weeks. Par-
ticipants were instructed only to install the extension on the device
and browser, which they use most often.
Each study phase lasted one week. The first week was a control
phase to measure browsing behavior (see above) for all participants
without the influence of an intervention. Since behavior change
could occur after simply contemplating privacy issues due to par-
taking in privacy related questionnaires [54], this pre-intervention
phase also served to allow behavior to normalize before the inter-
ventions. During the second week, participants in the nudge and
7https://docs.webshrinker.com/v3/website-category-api.html
8https://github.com/blueCat11/chiir-2021/tree/main/extension
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boost conditions were exposed to appropriate interventions once
per day. The presented intervention (either a nudge or a boost)
was chosen randomly from the set of previously not yet displayed
interventions, and two interventions were selected randomly to
be displayed twice. The nudges and boosts presented during the
study phases are summarized in Table 1. During the third week, the
interventions for the nudge and boost groups stopped. Nudges and
boosts are often claimed to differ in the way their effects last when
the nudge or boost itself is not present anymore [39]. The final
week captured behavior after nudges and boosts were no longer in
effect.
On completing the study, participants filled out the post-study
boost knowledge and demographic questionnaires. They received
debriefing information about the study, explaining the between-
groups design, nudges and boosts. A participation code was pro-
vided which allowed them to sign up for course credit compensa-
tion or a voucher lottery, and a means to access all possible nudges
and boosts, as related to their own behavior. Thus, in the end, all
participants received the same information, so that control group
participants were also able to benefit from any positive effects that
the nudges or boosts may have had. Participants were thanked and
provided with instructions on how to uninstall the extension.
4.5 Participants
76 German speaking participants who use Chrome or Firefox on
desktop or laptop computers were recruited via university and
social media platforms and a snowball sampling procedure. Of these,
68 participants filled out the questionnaires at the beginning of the
study, resulting in a response rate of 89%. At the end of the study, 60
participants filled out the questionnaires (12% drop-outs) and there
was one participant (p 122), who did not fill out any questionnaires,
but who provided browsing data. The data of the drop-outs and
p 122 was nevertheless used in analyses where appropriate, since
installing the browser extension was considered informed consent.
Participants were compensated with course credits if they were
students, and two 30€ vouchers were additionally raffled among
the participants, after the study was finished.
Of those who completed the study, 30 identified as female, 29
as male and 1 as diverse. The participants were aged between 19
and 60 (𝑀 = 25.52, 𝑆𝐷 = 8.8) , with 17 with at least Bachelor’s
degree and 38 with an entrance qualification to higher education.
The remaining five named vocational training or graduation from
other levels of schooling as their highest level of education.
During the study, 36 of the participants used Chrome, and 24
used Firefox. Windows was used by 47 participants, while 12 used
MacOs, and 1 person used Linux. Of the participants who finishing
the study, 21were in the nudge condition, 18 in the control condition
and 21 in the boost condition. Of all those where browsing data
was available, the conditions were not quite as equally distributed,
with 25 people in the nudge and boost conditions, but only 19 in
the control condition.
4.6 Results
In our analysis of the naturalistic study, we investigated several
aspects of our data. First, we further characterized our sample by
looking at their device and browser usage and their browsing be-
havior and were able to verify the information concerning website
categories and privacy, which was used in boosts. Second, we used
the self-reported and behavioral data to determine if there was
evidence for the privacy paradox. Third we examined whether
boosts succeeded in conveying knowledge, similar to our online
survey. Finally, we investigated the influence of nudges and boosts
on browsing privacy during different phases of the study.
4.6.1 Privacy Attitudes and Browsing Behavior. The sample (N=68)
can be characterized as being more knowledgeable about privacy
than the general German population (M=74.6th percentile, SD=20.4),
according to their OPLIS-score. Participants’ privacy concern, as
measured by IUIPC [52] wasmoderate to high (𝑀 = 5.59, 𝑆𝐷 = 0.71)
and they used between 0 and 7 (𝑀 = 2.67, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.91) different
measures to protect their privacy. Some also used browsers or search
engines, such as Tor or Duckduckgo, which protect privacy more
than the most common variants.
Although we instructed participants to use mostly the device
and browser with the extension, multiple device and browser usage
was self-reported by participants at the end of the study. However,
we only recorded behavior on the main device and browser. In most
cases of multiple device or multiple browser usage, the participants
used the study device and/or study browser more or equally often
compared to other equivalent devices and/or browsers.
During the study, 115,545 website visits from 30 different main
categories were recorded. The number of visits per website category
varied from aminimum of 3 (Jobs & Careers category) to amaximum
of 28322 (Entertainment category), but themean number of visits per
category was 3852 (SD=7601). In summary, with some exceptions,
the participants in this study visited similar types of websites across
conditions and phases of the study. These exceptions were often
due to certain categories of websites being visited by few distinct
participants, so there is not enough data to justify a trend.
At the start of the study, the number of active users of the exten-
sion increased over the first two days, because some participants
did not begin on the designated first day. For all conditions, the
number of daily internet users declined slightly towards the end
of the study, when only 36 participants in total were recorded as
browsing on the last full day of the study. Overall, participants
visited at least one website on between 1 and 22 days (𝑀 = 15.1,
𝑆𝐷 = 5.7). In general, the number of daily website visits for the
three conditions are relatively similar, and relatively stable during
the whole duration of the study.
4.6.2 Confirming Boost Information. Descriptive analyses allowed
us to determine whether the advice provided in the boost conditions
relating to the privacy risks and web site categories was true. The
following results consider the main category assigned to a website.
We consider entertainment, education and news sites, while all
other website visits fall into the other category.
In our data, both entertainment (𝑀 = 30.4, 𝑆𝐷 = 163.3) and
news sites (𝑀 = 11.5, 𝑆𝐷 = 21.9) had more third party requests
than other sites (𝑀 = 7.9, 𝑆𝐷 = 91.6), and education websites
(𝑀 = 3.00, 𝑆𝐷 = 19.0) had fewer, which replicates previous work
[23, 85]. However, concerning cookie changes, this number was
smaller for entertainment sites (𝑀 = −0.12, 𝑆𝐷 = 6.73) than other
sites (𝑀 = −0.06, 𝑆𝐷 = 19.2), and larger for education sites (𝑀 =




estimate robust CI z p
lower upper
intercept 8.66 3.27 2.03 15.3 2.65 .008**
OPLIS -0.62 0.22 -1.08 -0.16 -2.85 .004**
IUIPC -1.49 0.58 -2.62 -0.35 -2.57 .010*
OPLIS:IUIPC 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.20 3.10 .002**
Table 3: Parameter estimates w/ robust 95% CI for Poisson
regression model
0.20, 𝑆𝐷 = 8.67), even though news sites (𝑀 = 1.44, 𝑆𝐷 = 3.63) still
had the largest number of cookie changes of these four categories.
As in previous work [85], our metric observes the change in cookies
and not the number of cookies so this may be an explanation for
the difference.
4.6.3 Investigating the Privacy Paradox. To determine whether the
privacy paradox applies for our study participants, the influence
of privacy knowledge and privacy concerns as independent vari-
ables on self-reported privacy related actions as the dependent
variable was investigated using Poisson regression. It might seem
intuitive, that more protective actions are undertaken with height-
ened privacy concern, however, according to literature supporting
the privacy paradox, this is not the case [45, 77]. Without knowl-
edge about privacy, it is hard to judge threats, and know which
actions to take [13], so privacy knowledge is included as a predictor.
Since the number of privacy actions was measured as a theoretically
unconstrained count variable, a Poisson regression was used [18].
Further assumptions were tested using a poissonness plot [41] and
tests for over and under-dispersion, and were judged to be accurate.
Stepwise regression was used adding privacy knowledge, privacy
concern, and their interaction into the model one after the other, as
each significantly improved the model fit. The parameter estimates
for the final model are in Table 3.
Case-wise diagnostics show the analysis to be reliable. The sig-
nificant interaction was plotted using the interact.plot-function
from the interactions package [47], see Figure 2. It shows that when
privacy concern is above average (+1 SD), the number of privacy
protective actions becomes larger with growing privacy knowledge.
With average privacy concern, the slope of the regression line is
much less steep, but the predicted number of protective actions still
becomes larger with growing privacy knowledge. On the contrary,
when privacy concern is below average (-1 SD), the number of
privacy protective actions does not become larger with growing
privacy knowledge, but decreases.
However, self-reported privacy behavior differs from actual be-
havior [45], so this was additionally investigated. Proxies for brows-
ing privacy can be considered somewhat related to privacy behavior,
even if they are not quite the same. It is assumed that they reflect
the outcomes of privacy behavior so that if a participant behaves
in a way to achieve high browsing privacy, then the proxies for
browsing privacy, as utilized in this study, will be low.
For each of the two proxies for browsing privacy and each par-
ticipant, an average value was calculated including all the website
Figure 2: Interaction of final model, different color regres-
sion lines for M and M ± 1 SD of IUIPC values, w/ 95% CI
visits of the participants during the first week. The first week es-
tablished a baseline of behavior for all participants when none of
them had been exposed to any intervention yet. One participant
was excluded from this analysis, because they visited only three
websites on the final day of the first week.
Privacy concern and privacy knowledge did not predict a signifi-
cant amount of the variance in the average number of third party
requests during the first week of the study, 𝐹 (3, 61) = 0.81, 𝑝 = .81,
𝑅2 = 0.02, 𝑅2
𝐴𝑑 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
= −0.03. Likewise, they also did not predict
a significant amount of the variance in the average number of
changes in cookies during that time period, 𝐹 (3, 61) = 0.24, 𝑝 = .87,
𝑅2 = 0.01, 𝑅2
𝐴𝑑 𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
= −0.04. In general both models do not seem
to be a good fit for the data, as multiple cases cause concern, both
among potential outliers and the total sample. Violated assump-
tions, such as non-normal residuals, suggest that these two models
do not generalize well to the population. Thus, despite some partic-
ipants being concerned about privacy and reporting that they take
steps to address this, in practice there is little evidence of improved
outcomes as we measure them.
4.6.4 Boost Knowledge. To establish if experiencing boost inter-
ventions resulted in increased knowledge, we compared responses
of participants from the boost condition to those in the other two
conditions, who were not exposed to boosts. All participants an-
swered the same questions as the control-group participants in the
online survey, both at the beginning, and at the end of the three
week study. A one-way ANOVA was conducted using the differ-
ence between pre-study and post-study boost knowledge as the
dependent variable and condition (boost, other) as the independent
variable. Boost knowledge was calculated as the sum of the correct
questions, where there was only yes or no as an answer possibil-
ity. In cases where participants had to give a freetext answer, they
were assigned fractions of points depending on how far away their
answer was from the correct one. The difference was measured by
subtracting the pre-study boost knowledge from post-study boost
knowledge. The effect of condition on the difference between pre-
study and post-study boost knowledge was not significant, F(1,
58)=0.52, p=.67, 𝜔2 = -0.01.
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condition 0.18 2 <.001***
study phase 12.8 2 <.001***
condition:study phase 0.38 4 .490
average cookie
change
condition 44.2 2 <.001***
study phase 46.2 2 <.001***
condition:study phase 1.43 4 .230
Table 4: Results of the factorial ART for average amount of
third party requests and average cookie change
4.6.5 The Effect of Nudges and Boosts on Browsing Privacy. Dis-
tributional assumptions did not hold for multilevel modeling, and
since the two predictor variables of the most interest, condition, and
study phase, were categorical variables, an aligned rank transform
(ART) was performed [89]. It can be used as a non-parametric al-
ternative to repeated-measures ANOVA9. The dependent variables
were normalized over the number of site visits per day.
The first website visit for each participant id was excluded from
the analysis, as the change in cookies per website was measured as
the difference in cookies from the previous to the current website
visit. Consequently, for the first website visit, all cookies collected
on the participant’s device previous to participation in the study
were assigned to this website visit, which is not accurate. The results
of this analysis for both the dependent variables investigated above
are in Table 4. Post-hoc tests using the Tukey method to adjust p-
values were conducted to analyze the highly significant main effects
of condition and study phase on the proxies for browsing privacy.
The results were averaged over the levels of the variable currently
not under examination. According to these, the average amount
of third party requests in the first week differed significantly from
those in the second week 𝑡 (128) = 3.42, 𝑝 = .002 and the third
week 𝑡 (106) = 5.48, 𝑝 < .001. However, there was no significant
difference between the second and the third week with respect to
the average amount of third party requests, 𝑡 (107) = 1.88, 𝑝 = .15
The average amount of change in cookies in the first week differed
significantly from both those in the second week 𝑡 (141) = 5.65,
𝑝 < .001 and those in the third week 𝑡 (105) = 5.89, 𝑝 < .001, but
there was no significant difference in changes to cookies between
the third and second week, 𝑡 (107) = −−0.14, 𝑝 = .99. No significant
differences were found between the conditions and the proxies for
browsing privacy. This finding suggests a continued effect of the
interventions even after they were removed again in week 3.
These results are visualized in Figure 3 for third party requests,
and in Figure 4 for the change in number of cookies. They show a
drop in the number of third party requests for the boost condition
during the intervention phase, and this lower number stays stable
for the third week of the study. For the number of changes to
cookies, this is not the case. Instead, the levels for boosts are similar
to the control group, and browsing privacy for the nudge group
starts out lower (depicted by higher levels of the proxy) and then
increases during the intervention and post-intervention phases.
Confidence intervals for the first week are generally larger than
9This procedure was implemented in the ARTool package [89].
Figure 3: Effect of condition and study phase for average
number of third party requests (w/ 95% CI)
Figure 4: Effect of condition and study phase for average
change in cookies (w/ 95% CI)
for the other two weeks, maybe because due to some participants
starting the study late, they had fewer website visits overall.
5 DISCUSSION
Besides largely confirming previous work on the privacy invasive-
ness of different types of websites, we investigated three facets of
naturalistic privacy research. First, we evaluated whether being
exposed to boosts changed users’ knowledge about privacy. Par-
ticipants in the online survey were significantly more knowledge-
able when they were queried directly after having been exposed
to boosts. In the naturalistic study, knowledge was not improved
for boost group participants a week after their exposure. It could
be that contrary to what is claimed about boosts [39], their effect
weakens after the intervention, or that the knowledge conveyed in
the boost is not retained. Second we examined the widely known
privacy paradox phenomenon [45, 61]. Using self-reported behav-
ior, our analyses suggest that the privacy paradox does not apply
to our data, however using log data (e.g. the proxies for browsing
privacy), the opposite is the case. It must be taken into account that
the behavioral measures used in this analysis were only partially
under the users’ control. While they were able to influence their
browsing privacy by visiting certain types of websites, or using
certain browser settings, outside factors may have required them
to visit websites that add many cookies or send many requests to
third parties. Additionally, these facets of browsing privacy were
not visible to participants. Consequently, the behavioral measures
might not reflect participants’ agency concerning privacy. Third,
we conducted analyses using the proxies for browsing privacy to
determine whether participants’ behavior changed to be more pri-
vacy preserving under the influence of nudges and boosts. There
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were two significant main effects for both dependent variables. In
post-hoc analyses, only differences between the pre-intervention
and intervention, and pre-intervention and post-intervention study
phases were significant, and there were no significant differences
between the conditions. Plots (with un-normed means) indicate
that browsing privacy was worst in the first week for the nudge
group and change in number of cookies (Fig. 4) and for the boost
participants with respect to third party requests (Fig. 3).
This study had some limitations, such as the control used and
participant sample. Furthermore, even with thorough testing before
the study, we encountered technical challenges with the browser
extension. We were not able to retroactively change the exten-
sion during the study, but after reports from participants, the final
questionnaire was adjusted to include questions about problems.
Analyses were performed with and without these participants, but
our conclusions did not change and therefore include all data.
Naturalistic work is valuable, because it has a high ecological
validity, which is especially important in the domain of privacy
[48]. In the main study, participants used their own devices, and, in
most cases, the browser they were used to, over a period of multiple
weeks. Laboratory studies have shown that nudges and boosts
can influence behavior [e.g. 87, 91]. However, in this work, the
naturalistic nature of the data also meant that noise was introduced
because there was little control. There was no control over how long
or how focused participants interacted with the nudge and boost
interventions and over when, how often and how participants used
their devices to browse the internet. This may be another reason
why boost knowledge did not significantly improve over the course
of the naturalistic study, since interaction with interventions was
not enforced. Nevertheless, this reflects realistic conditions when
deploying nudges and boosts in the wild, so it is important to do
research under such conditions.
Our sample of participants is limited in size and heterogeneity.
For both analyses comparing nudges and boosts, confidence in-
tervals were wide, indicating uncertainty in the data. During the
process of fitting models, there were multiple instances when mod-
els did not converge, or other issues, such as overparametrization,
or singular fit, arose. This could be due to too little data. Since
participants were manually recruited for this study, and required to
install additional software themselves, the sample size was limited.
Web browsing data was available for 69 participants, but not for
all of the days in the study, and some participants only used the
study extension for a few days. This may be an explanation for why
the effectiveness of nudges and boosts as identified in laboratory
studies [17, 87, 91] is not as clear in this work.
Our sample was also limited in diversity. Snowball sampling
was used to acquire a more diverse sample, and succeeded to some
extent, but even so most of the participants were students, and
had a higher than average level of education. A common reason
why non-students did not participate was that participation re-
quired installing software on a laptop device which was frequently
used, and people from the working force declined participation
e.g. because they were not allowed to install external software on
their work laptop. Earlier work comparing different populations’
responses to SSL warnings suggested that students’ responses may
not necessarily differ from responses from a more diverse sample
[73], so we conclude that our results are valuable regardless the
high percentage of student participants.
The participants were advised to use the device and browser
with the study extension for their internet usage during the study.
Since it was difficult to recruit large numbers of participants for
a longitudinal study, participants who had multiple devices they
occasionally used, or who used different browsers, were also ap-
proved for participation. They were advised to use the study device
and browser as much as possible, and the final questionnaire in-
cluded questions on device and browser usage. Multiple device
and browser usage was fairly common among participants, but
in almost all cases, the study extension and browser were used
more or equally often. Nevertheless, future work should examine
cross-device privacy behavior.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper described an online survey examining the comprehensi-
bility of boosts, and a three-week naturalistic experiment, whereby
the effect of nudge and boost interventions on web browsing pri-
vacy was studied. It contributes to research on online privacy by
comparing nudges and boosts, as two paradigms to induce behav-
ioral change, using behavioral log data. We provide the source
code for an extension which can be used to explore users’ normal
browsing habits while presenting interventions in a real browsing
environment. Privacy is generally an interesting domain to compare
nudges and boosts, since it spans the whole web and is not focused
on certain sites or contexts, such as health search. As such, acquir-
ing more naturalistic data to get a broader picture in the domain of
privacy is easier than in more narrowly focused topics. Nudges and
boosts for privacy have potential to help users act more privacy
protectively [87, 91], but more work is needed to find out how to
best present and include them naturally in everyday browsing.
Future work could consider a more detailed examination of infor-
mation interaction during browsing. In this study, we aggregated
the proxies for browsing privacy per day, but our data enables
distinguishing website visits. This makes it possible to retrace the
progression of website visits over time, including possible changes
to settings, to identify possible reasons for such changes. Aside
from nudge or boost interventions, behavior changes could occur
dependent on the website type (e.g. dependent on the task type or
website, users may want more security [10, 82]). Settings could also
be changed because a website breaks due to measures intended to
protect privacy, but this cannot be derived from our data.
Finally, the use of mobile devices is on the rise, and an increasing
amount of people mainly access the internet through their mobile
phone [16]. However, mobile devices are more vulnerable to privacy
breaches, and do not offer as many privacy protective measures
[60]. Most research related to privacy on mobile devices focuses on
apps [e.g. 4, 5], even though browsing and searching the internet is
the activity on which the second largest amount of time is spent on
mobile devices [14]. Thus, future work should be extended beyond
desktop and laptop computers. Multiple device usage occurred in
this study, and it would be interesting to investigate how users
manage their privacy on multiple devices. Studying such effects
further can ultimately help align people’s privacy related behavior
to the level of privacy they wish to achieve, on any device.
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